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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an International Commercial Arbitration hearing. Imagine how
the procedure of your International Commercial Arbitration works. Maybe you
are already savvy and know of some international rules or you have looked up
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration to get a
picture.' You are, for example, an Anglo-American plaintiff's lawyer. Now
imagine the other party to this International Commercial Arbitration. Where are
they from? Let us say they are East Asian. So you assume the other party has
read the same rules since you have agreed to the use of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The arbitrator is French and
I. KAVASS & LIVAK, MODEL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
DOCUMENTORY HISTORY (William S. Hein Company 1985); UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, U. N. Commission on International Trade Law (1976), available at
http://www.unicatral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm (last visited August 27, 2002) (hereinafter
UNCITRAL).
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knows the rules quite well, mainly because she is the arbitrator. Now, as a
plaintiffs lawyer you want to "start the show", when the French arbitrator tells
you to limit your witness examination to 20 minutes each. Perplexed you
protest, because this is not what you are used to, but the arbitrator will hear
nothing.
What has happened? Differing expectations. In International Commercial
Arbitration more than just the legal issues are issues. Whether procedure is
agreed upon ad hoc, or institutional rules are used, expectations of the process
may well differ from participant to participant.2 Why? Divergence in cultural
backgrounds. This paper argues that despite harmonization of procedural rules
in International Commercial Arbitration, expectations of the process differ
based on cultural background of parties or arbitrators. In order to overcome
cultural barriers of this and other sorts, one should understand the differences
and use them creatively.3 This paper is intended to shed light on some of the
differences and thereby advocate understanding.
There are two caveats for this text. First, it must be clarified that the
lawyers may well be better informed than the parties and the expectations may
differ with increased experience and knowledge of background of other
participants.4 Second, my analysis applies to both ad hoc and institutional
arbitrations. The extent of the cultural influence on the process may differ.
Institutional arbitrations usually have more clearly defined rules of procedure
and tend to adopt a common approach for arbitrations, instead of a case-by-case
determination.
"Every person operates in his or her own private world perceptual field."5
Culture is part of what creates this field. This paper discusses how the
differences in culture influence the arbitral process. Notwithstanding the actual
norms prevailing in the International Commercial Arbitration process,
participants who may not know enough about this process (and who are basing
their expectations on experience gathered within their own legal culture) are
2. Participant in this paper is used to describe both parties and arbitrators.
3. PHILLIP HARRIS & ROBERT MORAN, MANAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 27 (1991).
4. With increased experience, the participants will schedule conferences in advance and discuss
issues of preference and procedure in more detail, so that initial expectations based on one's own, or the other
participant's cultures doesn't get the better of the proceeding. These issues often influence the choice of
arbitrators. Malkom Wilkey, The Practicalities of Cross-Cultural Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL
CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 79, 80 (Stefan Frommel & Barry Rider eds., 1999). The location
of the arbitration can also be influenced by culture. For example, due to their cultural background Switzerland
has arbitration rules advantageous for litigation against a foreign sovereign. Sigvard Jarvin, Leading
Arbitration Seats - A (Mostly European) Comparative View, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 39, 52 (Stefan Frommel & Barry Rider eds., 1999); see also Cbemado Cermades,
Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of Interactive Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL
CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 147, 165ff (Stefan Frommel & Barry Rider eds., 1999).
5. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 29.
bound to face surprise. This cannot be an exhaustive treatment of the matter and
will be a mere sample. To this end I will set a framework of reference based on
Harris' and Moran's definition of culture and introduce three different levels of
the concept 'culture'. Then this text will go on to show procedural differences
in the main legal cultures (Common Law and Civil Law) and how these
differences came about. Regionally based distinctions within these main
systems follow. This analysis will not include differences in substantive law.
II. WHAT IS CULTURE ANYWAY?
This section will identify what makes culture and create a working
definition. Some definitions, which can be found in dictionaries or sociologists'
writings define culture as "the total pattern of human behavior and its products
embodied in thought, speech, action, and artifacts and dependant of man's
capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations
through the use of tools, language, and systems of abstract thought."6 Others
define culture as a complex of typical behavior and standardized social forms
particular to one social group, or an atmosphere of social beliefs, preferences,
expectations, and common principles.'
I will adopt Phillip Harris' and Robert Moran's definition. "Culture gives
people a sense of who they are, of belonging, of how they should behave, and
what they should be doing." 8 It implies values and patterns that influence
attitudes and actions.9 In short, it is that which makes one function on a very
subconscious level.' 0
Culture can be separated into different subcategories. There are three
analytical levels, which group together certain aspects of culture. The first level
is called technical and is the unemotional, easily transferable part of culture,
such as grammar of a language."' The second, so-called formal aspect refers to
rituals both obvious and hidden, 12 such as taking off one's hat when entering a
room. 3 These rituals are learned by trial and error.' 4 Obviously, the hidden
ones are not easily learned and one of differing culture will not easily admit to
6. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, A-K 552 culture 5(a) (3rd ed. 1966).
7. Horatio Grigera Naon, Latin American Arbitration Culture and the ICC Arbitration System, in
CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 79, 117 (Stefan Frommel & Barry Rider eds.,
1999).
8. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 12.
9. Id.
10. Insights into the workings of culture have been discovered by the behavioral sciences, i.e.
sociology, psychology and anthropology.
11. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 39.
12. Id. at 39, 40.
13. This is a western cultural habit.
14. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 39, 40.
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their effect. This level is prone to misunderstandings and is emotionally
charged. The third level is the informal level. 15 It describes automatic and
almost unconscious responses. 16 This level is also highly emotional and is only
learned through modeling, e.g., how males and females interact. These levels
form the basis of culture.
17
Culture influences many aspects of life, attitude, social organization,
thought patterns, space requirements, body language, and time sense. 8 Thought
patterns bear effect on the process of reasoning, be it legal or otherwise. What
is perfectly logical, self-evident and reasonable for one culture may be
offensive, illogical, and unreasonable for the other. Cultural background
strongly influences the legal systems and understandings. 9 International
Commercial Arbitration being an alternative legal instrument will be expected
to be similar in goals and procedure to the legal system the participant is used
to. Persons always expect what they are used to, to be the norm. Therefore,
cultural backgrounds, by birth or education, also influences how people
approach arbitration and what they expect of it in substance as well as in
procedure and formalities. This expectation will in many instances be based on
repeated experience in the person's cultural context.
While the substantive outcome in International Commercial Arbitration is
not usually based on cultural expectation, procedure is. Substantive law and
even basic norms will differ not only from culture to culture but also from
country to country.2 Laws are specific and while the expectation is that the
decision is at least based on some legal principle, there is no expectation of one
concrete and certain outcome.2' Procedure however, in its most basic form is
expected to be the same based on continuous, substantially identical
reoccurrence in one's own culture. Participants expect procedure as a part of
the formal aspect of culture. A common law, Anglo-American Lawyer will
most likely expect a highly adversarial approach, while a civil law East Asian
will expect that an inquisitorial and conciliatory approach be taken by the
arbitral panel and all parties involved. This basic difference plays out in the
timing and ease of introduction of evidence, record keeping, and other examples
further discussed below.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See generally the works of E.T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE; THE HIDDEN DIMENSION:
BEYOND CULTURE; AND THE DANCE OF LIFE.
18. See HARRIS & MORAN, supra note 3, at 40-42.
19. See generally PIETER SANDERS, QUO VADIS ARBITRATION (1999).
20. Even the two common law countries, the United Kingdom and United States, differ widely on
how much discovery is allowed.
21. This is not to mean that participants cannot be completely surprised by an outcome. Often a
different legal principal was applied than expected.
Expectancy of a certain procedure is worth analyzing in light of the predominant
legal systems. The arbitrator may be of a culture that expects the proceeding to
be conducted in one way, while the parties may be prepared for another, their
own way. What the main differences are and how exactly they can play out will
be discussed below.
H. DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL CULTURE
Two legal systems or cultures are predominant in the world today:
Common Law and Civil Law. Within these main legal systems, different
regionally based sub-cultures exist, which maintain their own special
traditions.2 This section will discuss the attributes of first Common and Civil
Law, and then continue to describe local distinctions.23 This paper will briefly
sketch infra how these differences and distinctions arose and what purposes they
serve in their respective environments.
Recent doctrinal writings indicate an increasing trend toward
harmonization of international arbitral procedure.24 For example, it is generally
accepted that a person who has served as mediator or conciliator between the
parties to the current dispute shall not serve as umpire. 25 Domestic legislation
and procedures of international organizations concerning International
Commercial Arbitration evidence this assessment further.26 This text will focus
on the remaining differences. Nevertheless, cultural differences are far from
irrelevant today, because neither ad hoc nor institutional rules adopted by the
parties answer all procedural questions.27
A. Common Law & Civil Law
While rules, which have been agreed upon by the parties, give some
guidelines for the procedure, the individual preference of the participants plays
an important role. This preference relates to the cultural background of each
22. See generally SANDERS, supra note 19.
23. These attributes will be directed at procedure only.
24. See e.g., SANDERS, supra note 19, at 55; see also Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The
"Americanization ofInternational Arbitration?, 16(4) MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 37,(2001).
25. Bernardo M. Cremades, Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of Interactive
Arbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Stefan Frommel & Barry
Rider eds., 1999). He limits this statement by saying that parties can still nominate the person if so desired.
26. Most modem international arbitration conventions such as the PCA rules on arbitration of
environmental disputes, as well as the increasing adoption of the UNCITRAL model law into domestic law
(or its use as guiding light), are only examples of increased harmonization of rules for arbitration. This is true
for both institutional and ad hoc arbitrations, as discussed before.
27. See Christian Borris, The Reconciliation Between Common Law and Civil Law Principles in the
Arbitration Process, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1,4 (Stefan Frommel
& Barry Rider eds., 1999).
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participant and influences all aspects of the International Commercial
Arbitration, for example, choice of International Commercial Arbitration rules,
arbitrators, location for the International Commercial Arbitration, and
expectations in process and outcome. 8
Methodology of the approach makes the first difference, which impacts
expectations, apparent. A Common Law lawyer expects an adversarial
approach,29 where the judge or arbitrator has a limited role. The adversarial
approach manifests itself in all stages of the proceeding: notification,
identification of facts, responsibilities of the parties, and so forth. 30 This system
was created because of mistrust of judges, the smaller the roles of judges in the
proceedings the easier for the parties to believe in the justice and fairness of the
outcome. 31 The Civil Law expects an active judge and an inquisitorial system.32
This distinction appears logical, based on the assumption that not a jury but the
judge decides the case and hence needs to make sure he has all the information.
In Civil Law countries, judges were not mistrusted. Their education made them
experts in assessing a case correctly, while the juror, potentially a neighbor, was
considered more concerned with his or her own interests and not trained to deal
with important legal issues.
The second distinction between Common Law and Civil Law is that there
is no clear division of interlocutory proceeding and hearing in Civil Law.34
Common Law admits information of the pre-hearing stage only in exceptional
circumstances. This separation can be explained by reference to the mistrust of
judges and the jury system in Common Law countries once again. Where, as
in Civil Law, the judge is also the fact-finder, he will get to know everything
about the case regardless. There is no practical reason for a divorce of hearing
and pre-hearing phase. In Common Law, the jurymen do not receive any
information before the proceeding. 35 Therefore, all the information needs to be
introduced to the jury again. Lawyers have to select and properly present
information, because the jury is composed of laypersons, which might consider
irrelevant evidence or fail to understand anything too complicated.
28. RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
52(1999).
29. See Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 24.
30. See GARNETr ET AL., supra note 27, at 53.
31. See Borris, supra note 27, at 6. In the U.S. judges were English and were disliked and the
United States mistrusted authority, mainly because of the age of their democracy.
32. See BORRIS, COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW: FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES AND THEIR IMPACT
ON ARBITRATION, 78 (1994); see also Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, supra note 24.
33. See BORRIS, supra note 32, at 178.
34. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 28, at 54.
35. They are not yet selected.
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To illustrate the cultural impact at all stages of the proceeding, this paper
will discuss the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration 36 in light of some specific expectations in the proceedings, differing
between Common Law and Civil Law. This paper will treat only the
UNCITRAL rules for this purpose due to their representativeness and their wide
use.37 These rules provide for great discretion in determination of procedure.38
Most commonly cited differences that influence the expectations are:
a) Whether the proceedings are oral or in writing;
b) Discovery and pre-hearing procedure;
c) Treatment of other witnesses, specifically parties and cross-
examination; and
d) Record keeping.
1. Oral or Written Proceedings
The UNCITRAL rule 24(1) leaves the decision whether to hold a hearing
to the arbitral tribunal, unless parties agree otherwise. A hearing shall be held
if a party so requests.39 It is not stated which weight will be given to such
pleadings and how much detail will be good practice depends on any given
arbitrator's preference.
Under the Common Law, pleadings have little value, because the oral
hearing is of most importance.4" The fact finder has to be convinced during the
"show", the proceeding of whatever nature.4" This can largely be explained by
the need for persuasion of a jury of laypersons. Paper tends to be less
persuasive than emotions and live testimony. In Civil Law all information has
to be identified and provided in writing and often in excessive detail as soon as
possible. This is evidenced by e.g., the German Code of Civil Procedure § 296.
A judge is not (should not be as easily) moved by emotion and a judge could
extract the relevant facts more quickly from paper than from lengthy witness
testimony and cross-examination.42 The Civil Law lawyer expects the
documents provided to amply support the point of view, and the Common Law
36. See UNCITRAL supra note 1.
37. There are regional arbitration rules precisely because there are differences in culture. See
SANDERS, supra note 3, at 13.
38. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 19.
39. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 24(1).
40. See Borris, supra note 27, at 6.
41. See Patouchi and Ian L. Meakin, Procedure and Taking of Evidence in International
Commercial Arbitration, RDAIIBLJ 88 (1996).
42. The judge can ask a witness everything he needs to know when documents are not sufficient.
Often this will be unavailable. Thus, the Civil Law judge prefers paper as a general matter.
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lawyer is perplexed because of the lack of weight given to his advocacy by the
Civil Law arbitrator.43
2. Discovery and Pre-Hearing Procedures
The secondly impacted area of arbitral procedure is the pre-hearing stage,
including discovery. The UNCITRAL rules provide in article 23(1) that parties
should support their claims and defenses with all relevant documents, but are
also allowed to use references to evidence to be submitted later only, unless
otherwise agreed. 4 In other words, information must be provided, but the point
in time is up to the party, so long as a reference to this evidence exists. In
article 24(3), UNCITRAL requires all material submitted to the panel to be
submitted to the other party as well.45 This is the extent to which pre-hearing
procedure is discussed in the Model Law.
Due to this freedom of procedure, culture has room to create expectations.
In Common Law, discovery and pre-hearing procedure are considered one of
the most important tools in dispute resolution (eitherjudicial or through ADR) 6
Pre-hearing discovery is necessary in Common Law. The evidence needs to be
neatly presented for the reasons discussed supra, which is impossible if the
hearing is the first time the evidence is encountered by the parties. Thus, while
attempting to receive as much information as possible before the hearing, the
Common Law advocate will seek to delay rendering information to obtain a
strategic benefit. With these considerations in mind, the advocate will submit
evidence late and potentially upset the Civil Law arbitrator, who seeks prompt
disclosure of all relevant information.
In Civil Law the obligation to disclose every relevant piece of information
as soon as possible renders extensive Common Law discovery (partially)
unnecessary.47 For many Civil Law jurisdictions, such as Germany, discovery
is also connected with privacy concerns.4" In Civil Law there is no need to
present the evidence the neat Common Law way. Evidence is presented over
time and is reviewed by the judge regardless of when it becomes known. If any
information appears to be missing, the arbitrator or judge will request it.
Also depositions take on varying degrees of importance for Common Lawyer
and Civil Lawyer. If the hearing is approached with the expectation of a
deposition not being primary evidence, the conduct at the deposition (if they
take place at all) is going to be different from the expectation of it being
43. Compare Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, supra note 24, at I.
44. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 23(1).
45. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 24(3).
46. See Christian Borris, supra note 27, at 10.
47. Id. at 10ff.
48. Id. at 11.
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equivalent to a witness statement on the stand. Preparation needs to be adapted,
the lawyer has to take into account that the entire material will be reviewed and
that withholding of information harms the case rather than helping it. In
addition, a Civil Law arbitrator may even prefer a written statement to an oral
one for reasons of efficiency, 49 as mentioned above.
3. Treatment of Witnesses
Treatment of witnesses is another area where cultural difference is most
visible. ° The UNCITRAL is silent on the matter. Several issues are implicated
in the treatment of witnesses:
1) Whether a party can be a witness;
2) Whether the statements can be written;
3) Whether written statements are preferable over directly
examined witnesses; and
4) Whether cross-examination should take place.
In Common Law a party may be called as witness, while the Civil Law
does generally not allow parties to be witnesses.' In Civil Law, the expectation
is that the position of parties will be amply reproduced through other
documents. In Civil Law, managers of a company are considered parties.
Although the question whether a party can be a witness remains a distinction
between Common and Civil Law, in International Commercial Arbitration it is
a distinction without a difference. Practice has settled toward the Common Law
approach. 2
Whether written witness statements are admissible depends on the
procedure chosen, but largely, as in the UNCITRAL 3 The inference drawn
from a written statement depends on the legal culture of the arbitrator. In
Common Law countries, due to the importance of the actual hearing and the
separation of information gained before the hearing from information presented
at the hearing, cross-examination remains the best tool to test witness
credibility 4 and to bring out facts not otherwise presentable.55 In Civil Law
countries, the judge examines witnesses as to contentious issues. He, as the
49. See Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 24, at Il.
50. Id. at IV.
51. See Borris, supra note 28, at 15; see also Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 24, at IV.
52. Id.
53. See Reed & Sutcliffe, supra note 24, at IV.
54.
54. See Lawrence Newman, International Arbitration Hearings: Showdown or Denounent, 5
TUL.J.INT'L & COMP.L. 393, 395 (1997).
55. See Christian Borris, supra note 27, at 13.
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fact-finder and a professional, is deemed to assess the witness credibility by
himself and only with reference to statements he deems important. 56 Although
a difference between the two traditions, this point adds little to the point made
supra concerning pretrial procedure.
The distinction in treatment for unwilling witnesses depends less on
culture and more on country, the procedure what one needs to compel
the witness differs. 57  These issues are related much more to
substantive law and does not relate as strongly to culture. Hence, it
exceeds the scope of this paper and will not be treated in more
detail. 8
4. Record Keeping
The UNCITRAL does not mention record keeping. In the Common Law
tradition, a reporter records the proceeding verbatim. 9 In the Civil Law system,
the chairman usually takes notes of the witness statement in the manner in
which he sees fit. The parties discuss these notes and supplement them to
prepare a written summary.6" A summary makes sense where the evidence is
mostly documentary and witnesses are heard for specific information only. This
method obviously reduces the impact of cross-examination in case it is
conducted and can be the source of great dismay on Common Law lawyers, who
rely on every word that the witness utters.
Although the above-mentioned differences in legal cultures factor into the
proceedings, they are not the only issues to be considered. Within the
predominant legal systems, further subdivisions exist.
The Common Law and Civil Law concepts and the respective conceptions
of International Commercial Arbitration and legal culture have radiated
throughout the world.6' The concepts are largely colonial remainders and can
56. Id.
57. In the United States, arbitrators can subpoena witnesses. In England, only the court may do so.
In Denmark, the arbitral tribunal has to make a request to the court to subpoena, while in Belgium, the parties
can ask a court themselves. See SANDERS, supra note 3 at 256f.
58. For an American case illustrating this point see In Re: Application of Technostroy Export, 853
F.Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In this case arbitration took place in Sweden. The Russian party to the
arbitration proceedings sought discovery in New York in connection with the arbitration. The American party
objected on grounds that discovery in the place or arbitration was not available without the ruling of the
arbitrator and that discovery must, if at all, be mutual. The court agreed on this basis. While this case shows
differences from country to country, it is not truly culturally based. The Russian party was well aware of the
differences and sought to use them in their favor.
59. See Newman, supra note 54, at 84.
60. Id.
61. Id.
be traced in individual tradition to the respective colonial powers and their legal
systems.62
B. Regional Cultures
Today, either Civil or Common Law influence most nations; nevertheless
differences lay in the regional applications. This section discusses each culture
and its distinction and the impact on the International Commercial Arbitration.
The main cultures this paper refers to are Non-Arab African Countries, Latin
American Countries, East Asian, and Arab Countries; e.g., Belgium for the
former Congo, the Netherlands for Indonesia.63
1. Non-Arab Africa
This section excludes Arab countries like the Sudan, because cultural
differences in Arab Countries are considered together, due to the shared feature
of Shari'a law.
There is currently no African distinctiveness in the procedural rules. 64 This
however, does not prejudice certain culturally based expectations. In non-Arab
Africa, a common dislike of arbitration is based on the perceived potential for
the bigger bargaining power to abuse the freedom of contract and thus oppress
the other party.65 Countries in Africa are particularly well known for their
dispute settlement processes that are conciliatory in nature.66 African social
values in conjunction with strong family units fostered this conciliatory
environment rather than the (in comparison) more adversarial arbitration
process. 67 Before colonialization every region in Africa had these conciliatory
methods of dispute resolution, which were suppressed but not destroyed during
the colonialization period.68
In the francophone areas of Africa, International Commercial Arbitration
was largely suppressed.69 This might also explain the current lack of significant
participation of African arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration. As
62. For example, Belgium for the former Congo, and the Netherlands for Indonesia. See Phillip
McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at International Commercial
Arbitration, 93 Nw.U.L.REV. 453, at ch. Hl. intro. (1999).
63. Id.
64. Roland Amoussou-Guenou, Part IV - Francophone Africa, in ARBITRATION IN AFRICA 269,
276, 277 (Cotran et al. eds., 1996).
65. See AMAzuA.AsoUZtJ, INTERNATIONALCOMMERICAL ARBITRATON AND AFRICAN STATES, 14
(Cambridge University Press 2001).
66. Id. at 15.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 115.
69. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at chap. 11 intro.
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Africa consists mostly of developing countries, International Commercial
Arbitration is viewed with skepticism.
70
In traditional African alternative dispute resolution, little procedural
uniformity can be found. Much of African tradition ADR is based on custom
and thus, widely varies and is highly informal. 71 There is for example no formal
requirement of writing or record keeping in traditional African dispute
resolution72 and a written agreement to arbitrate is today almost unknown.73
This results, usually in much control of courts over procedure. Lawyers
may have to get leave from a court for many things they would usually expect
to be handled by the arbitral panel. In fact, the courts form an essential element
of procedure and process in arbitration in Africa. Arbitral functions required
under a law or treaty in Africa could, for the sake of efficiency, specialization
and centralization be conferred to a-court.74
2. East Asia
Asia has a very distinct cultural approach to International Commercial
Arbitration. Two important differences dominate the picture. First, the
conception of Western Common Law and Civil Law (which form the basis of
Asian legal systems as well) has certain assumption for the role of codes and
contracts that are not shared in most of Asia.75  The conceptions of the
contractual or institutional rules for International Commercial Arbitration are
thus approached (like any other contract or code) with different understandings
of their meanings, although the terms may be clear. East Asian culture prefers
non-confrontational methods of conflict resolution. 76 A typical example is
Japan. Under a stable feudal regime, which lasted for more than 250 years until
1868 (Tokugawa period), the practice of law was not allowed. There was a
strong communal system to promote amicable settlement of disputes and to
suppress litigation. Litigation was condemned as a moral wrongdoing to the
society and to the other party. A good judge was not supposed to give a
judgment but to try to bring about a good conciliation. This tradition was
deeply embedded in the people's mind and formed the dispute resolution culture
in Japan,77 as well as other East Asian Countries. The legal basis for modern
70. This skepticism is slowly declining. See David Butler & Eyvind Finsen, Southern Africa, in
ARBITRATION IN AFRICA 193, 198 (Cotran et al. eds., 1996).
71. See ASOUZU, supra note 65, at 118.
72. Id. at 119.
73. Id. at 141.
74. Id. at 172.
75. See McConnaughay, supra note 62, at 458.
76. Id.
77. See YASUHEI TANIGUCHI, Is THERE A GROWING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CULTURE? AN
OBSERVATION FROM ASIA, chapter I (Albert Jan van den Berg ed. 1998).
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arbitration procedure was first established in Japan in 1890, with the enactment
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law No. 29, 1890), which substantially
followed the German Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 as a model.78 But even
though Japan has modernized its arbitral practice, the mistrust of arbitration can
still be felt in e.g., the requirement of specificity of the arbitral agreement.
79
Another aspect of Japanese arbitration is the remaining tendency to structure an
arbitration in a conciliatory fashion, e.g., the default number of arbitrators is
two, an even number as opposed to the otherwise chosen odd numbers.8°
And will approach International Commercial Arbitration with the same
culturally based attitude.81
More than 120 years ago, von Jhering wrote about Der Kampf ums
Recht (the fight for the right). Litigation is an arena where such a
fight takes place. It is a moral wrong not to assert one's right. What
I call the conciliation culture, on the other hand, is based on a
diametrically opposed ideology. It stems from a deep mistrust in any
pre-set rules of law and the concept of right as an absolute
entitlement.82
When a Western culture and a East Asian culture join for International
Commercial Arbitration, the approach of the lawyers have to be adapted to the
culturally based preference of the arbitrator. Overly confrontational behavior
may lead an East Asian arbitrator to draw different inferences from a non-East
Asian arbitrator.83
The second important difference of culture influencing the arbitral
procedure is confidentiality. International Commercial Arbitration is a loss of
face for the East Asian party.t While Western culture prefers open
proceedings, the East Asian party will prefer to keep it proceedings and most
information confidential. These differences in preference will also influence
how the proceeding will be conducted despite general and very loose norms
about it in institutional rules and most International Commercial Arbitration
contracts.
78. See Prof. Teruo Doi, Japan, in ICCA HANDBOOK chap. I (1)(1996).
79. Id. at chap. L
80. Id. at chap. 1(3).
81. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at 64.
82. See TANIGUCHI supra note 77, at section (In).
83. See Urs Martin Lauchli, Cross Cultural Negotiations with a Special Focus on ADR with the
Chinese, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1045, 1076 (2000). Promotion of long-term relations and the preference
for conciliation will always the guide the Chinese mediator.
84. See McConnaughay, supra note 62, at 459.
85. The UNCITRAL is silent on the matter.
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In CIETAC (China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission) for example, rules for arbitration are structured very differently
from common western arbitration rules. The rules provide for no appellate
process, which is usually common for international commercial arbitration
institutions. Another difference, again showing the preference for conciliation
is that the arbitral tribunal may conciliate if they so choose.86 The last important
difference in the Cietac procedure is the availability of a summary procedure for
amounts below RMB 500.000 Yuan. 87 Many western lawyers find the CIETAC
rules oppressive and unworkable.
3. Latin America
Latin America has a slowly disappearing hostile attitude toward
International Commercial Arbitration.88 Traditionally, Latin American countries
developed theories such as the "Calvo" and "Drago" doctrines to prevent
complete freedom of contract concerning international commercial arbitration. 89
A number of Latin American countries have modernized their arbitration laws
or are in the process of doing so, mainly to attract international arbitration
business. 9° Some countries modernizing their laws base their new arbitration
legislation on the Model Law of UNCITRAL. This is the case in Brazil,
Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. 9' Where International Commercial Arbitration
is conducted, the arbitral panels have an even stronger stand during the
proceeding than even ordinary Civil Law arbitrators would take. They act
mostly without judicial assistance.9 A Latin American participant would thus
expect strong control during the proceeding itself from the arbitrator. Latin
American participants in International Commercial Arbitration would expect
rather inflexible rules and may thus be surprised at International Commercial
Arbitration, where the rules are so amendable toward party autonomy.
93
Nevertheless, Latin American courts maintain strong supervisory powers over
86. Arbitration .Rules, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission § 46
(1998), at http://web.signet.com.sg/-arbiter/cietac2.html (last visited September 5, 2002).
87. Arbitration Rules, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission §64ff
(1998), at http://web.signet.com.sg/-arbiter/cietac3.htm (last visited September 5, 2002).
88. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at 39; see also Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Major Trends in
International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America, 17(l) J. INT'L ARB. 139 (2000).
89. See ASOUZU, supra note 65, at 413.
90. See ARTHUR D. HARVERD, THE CONCEPT OF ARBITRATION AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY, THE
COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE (Geoffrey M. Beresford ed., 1997).
91. See Charles Robert Norberg, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration-General Introduction to
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration, in ICCA HANDBOOK chapter 2 (1996).
92. See Mantilla-Serrano, supra note 88, at 141.
93. Id.
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the arbitral process.94 Party autonomy is not paramount like in the traditional
Western World.
4. Arab World
Arbitration has an important role in the mentality, history, and customs of
Arab Nations.95  In contrast to other regional structures, the concept of
International Commercial Arbitration in the Arab world is truly culturally based,
(the basis is the Muslim faith.) because both Civil Law and Common Law have
influenced different Arab countries.96
The predominantly impacting factor is the Shari'a, the religious law for
Muslims. 97 In Moslem Law the very concept of International Commercial
Arbitration was disputed. There are two views on this topic: the first holds that
International Commercial Arbitration is a form of amiable composition,
conciliation.98 According to this view, the number of arbitrators is even and a
decision requires unanimity. The other sees it as judicial action with an odd
number of arbitrators. 99 The Ottoman Empire adopted the conciliation
approach.100
In the Arab World, much like in Asia, International Commercial
Arbitration is more similar to conciliation,' 01 because the focus is on the
spiritual and the relationships not on an allocation of blame. A very important
distinction is that it is expected that the Shari'a and its procedural requirements
apply regardless of what the contract states.0 2 This is especially true for
International Commercial International Commercial Arbitration because the
Shari'a law has an element of international law. It applies regardless of the
jurisdiction the Muslim is in, based on religion, transcending national
boundaries.'03
Expectations of Muslim arbitrators and participants in specific parts of the
arbitral procedure vary distinctly from Western approaches. The UNCITRAL
provides for party autonomy, but in absence of an agreement, the number of
94. See e.g., Prof. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Colombia, in ICCA HANDBOOK.
95. See Abdul Hamid EI-Ahdab, General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries, in I ICCA
HANDBOOK chap. 1.
96. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at 50. Common Law for Iraq, Jordan, Sudan and Civil Law for
Algeria, Lebanon and Libya.
97. Although it contains only few references to arbitration.
98. See E1-Ahdab, supra note 95, at chapter H.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 133.
102. It is further applicable extraterritorially.
103. See Austin Amissah, Ghana, in ARBITRATION IN AFRICA 113, 128 (Cotran et al. eds., 1996).
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arbitrators is three, not one." 4 A Muslim Lawyer from a traditionally religious
country will expect that only one arbitrator is chosen. The Shari'a permits
exceptions to the one arbitrator rule, but if an exception is permitted, the
decision of the panel has to be unanimous.' °5 In non-Arab cultures, the majority
rule applies. This leads to different expectations in the choice of arbitrators and
if there is more than one arbitrator a different expectation in the outcome (ay a
close case has 5 arbitrators). The Arabic parties may well expect that at least
one sees the other side, thus avoiding any result of the arbitration and
encouraging a settlement.
Shari'a also limits the expectations of who can be an umpire. An Arab
party will expect, in accordance with the Shari'a, that the arbitrator must be a
male and familiar with the Shari'a, 106 while other cultures will not expect such
limitations. UNCITRAL article 11 does not provide for qualifications or
gender, but contains complete party autonomy. The Shari'a law, however,
provides for much procedural freedom. The only requirements for Arbitration
procedure are that the award must specify that the arbitrator heard the parties'
arguments and that the proceedings took place in his presence.107
The influence of Shari'a on International Commercial International
Commercial Arbitration is however declining, since it does not apply where e.g.,
international conventions supercede. °8
I will address these modem developments by contrasting the examples of
Egyptian and Tunisian treatment of International Commercial Arbitration with
what has been described so far. The Egyptian arbitration laws are inspired by
the UNCITRAL rather than Shari'a, as it is the case in Saudi Arabia.10 9 In the
new Egyptian Legislation enacted in 1994 for example the application of the act
is limited by territory, unlike earlier arbitral acts that were applied
extraterritorially like in Shari'a. Arbitrators needed to be appointed in the
instrument already under older legislation, the new legislation provides for party
autonomy. "0
In Tunisia, prior to 1993 only domestic arbitration was regulated. Again,
the act is modeled on the UNCITRAL model law. The number of arbitrators
needs to be uneven and the majority rule applies unlike prescribed in Shari'a
104. UNCITRAL, supra note 1, at § 10.
105. See SANDERS, supra note 19, at 51.
106. See generally Afchar, The Muslim conception of Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, vol 2 ch. I (1975); see also SANDERS, QUO VADIS ARBITRATION 51 (1999).
107. See Abdul Hamid EI-Ahdab, General Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries, in I ICCA
HANDBOOK, chapter 2(4)(1996).
108. See Amissah, supra note 103, at 130.
109. ABDULHAMADEL-AHDABARBIRATION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES 155 (2nd ed. 1999).
110. Id. at 173.
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Law, where unanimity is the norm."' Nevertheless, an inexperienced lawyer
or layperson may still expect some of the commands of the Shari'a law to be
universal, or at least the norm.
IV. USING THIS INFORMATION
Knowing the distinctions this paper has shown is helpful in every
International Commercial Arbitration. However, knowledge is only the key, not
the solution. Depending on the stage of the process, the solution is one of two
things: either the choice of the right arbitrator or an initial conference.
The participants to International Commercial Arbitration should select an
arbitrator according to his experience (both life and legal) and cultural
background (not just nationality) to obtain a strategic benefit. What the 'best
bet' concerning background and experience is depends on what the parties want
to achieve.
An initial conference should take place regardless, to clear any
misunderstandings before any further steps after the arbitrators are chosen.
During the initial conference, not only should applicable law and location of the
proceeding be discussed, but also the weight of specific forms of evidence, the
treatment of witnesses, and the role of the arbitrator (whether he should be
attempting conciliatory techniques where he sees the possibility, or whether
such techniques would be regarded by the parties as bias). Depending on the
cultures and backgrounds of the participants, the list of what should be
discussed varies. This paper gives a useful set of possible considerations for
each culture.
V. CONCLUSION
There are problems that rules do not solve. 1 2  Neither ad hoc nor
institutional rules contain answers for all procedural questions that may arise in
International Commercial Arbitration. On the contrary, as seen on the example
of the UNCITRAL rules, these rules are often deliberately vague to avoid
prejudicing the arbitral tribunal's discretion.1"' There is a recognizable influence
of culture even in the experienced lawyer or arbitrator. Despite harmonization
of rules governing International Commercial Arbitration, increased
globalization and perforation of information about other legal systems, this
paper showed that culture continues to play a role.
I 11. See Habib Malouche, Tunesia, in VI ICCA HANDBOOK, 2 (1996).
112. Lawrence W. Newman, Pre-hearing Conferences - Cross Cultural Conflicts, Address at
Seminar at Baker & MacKenzie New York (November 25, 1996), in 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 82,
87(1997).
113. See GARNETT supra note 28, at 4.
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This paper was intended to serve a guide for the unwary to begin to
research what to expect and what strategy may be more successful with which
culture. It is also intended to advocate initial conferences with all participants
about their expectations to avoid embarrassing moments in the course of the
International Commercial Arbitration. As stated in the introduction, this text
attempted to create a new understanding and respect for the other cultures, an
understanding that avoids judging others by one's own standards, because at one
point the other's standards might be there to judge you. Preparation, insight,
and respect are very helpful tools to avoid problems in cross-cultural
International Commercial Arbitration.
